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Abstract
This paper concerns income taxation, commodity taxation, produc-
tion taxation and public good provision in a multi-jurisdiction framework
with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each ju-
risdiction is large in the sense that its government is able to inﬂuence
the world-market producer price of the externality-generating commod-
ity. The decision-problem facing the government in each such jurisdiction
is represented by a two-type model (with asymmetric information between
the government and the private sector). We show how the possibility to
inﬂuence the world-market producer price adds mechanisms of relevance
for redistribution and externality-correction which, in turn, aﬀect the do-
mestic use of taxation and public goods. Finally, with the noncooperative
Nash equilibrium as a reference case, we consider the welfare eﬀects of
policy coordination.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the literature on transboundary environmental problems, it has been recog-
nized that national environmental policies may fail to fully internalize exter-
nalities, and that policy cooperation among countries (or regions) is generally
required in order to reach a globally optimal resource allocation. There are sev-
eral sources of ineﬃciency associated with noncooperative policies; for instance,
individual countries are likely to disregard the transboundary component of the
environmental damage they cause, since their policy-decisions are typically gov-
erned by national objectives, and their policies may also give rise to side eﬀects
via changes in the price system. However, despite the existence of certain supra-
national agreements, there is still substantial room for policies decided upon at
the national level or by subgroups of countries such as the EU, suggesting that
the incentives underlying decentralized policies are important to understand.
This paper concerns optimal taxation and public good provision at the na-
tional level, as well as the welfare eﬀects of policy coordination, in an economy
where the aggregate consumption of a particular good, to be called ’dirty good’,
generates a transboundary environmental problem. Our study is based on a
framework with mixed taxation, where each national government faces a non-
linear income tax as well as linear commodity and production taxes. This set
of tax instruments provides a reasonably realistic description of the tax system
that many national governments have at their disposal. It also implies that the
use of distortionary taxes is a consequence of optimization under informational
restrictions; it is not a consequence of any (arbitrary) restriction imposed on
the set of tax instruments.
Contrary to earlier literature on environmental policy under mixed taxation
(see below), we assume that the countries are large in the sense that each na-
tional government is able to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the world-market producer price
of the externality-generating good. Such a framework is interesting to consider
for at least two reasons. First, although many countries are small enough to
make the ’price-taking government’ assumption realistic, the environmental pol-
icy scene is also characterized by large actors such as the U.S. and some other
countries, as well as by subgroups of countries acting together such as the EU,
where the price-taking assumption appears to be less realistic. Our study takes
this observation to its extreme point by analyzing a world-economy comprising2 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
a number of large actors, whose governments recognize (and incorporate into
their decision-problems) that their policies will aﬀect the world-market producer
prices of externality-generating commodities. Second, our approach integrates
earlier literature on the so called ’leakage’ phenomenon with the theory of mixed
taxation, which makes it possible to compare large and small open economies
with respect to the whole tax structure; not just with respect to environmental
policy.
T h el i t e r a t u r eo nﬁscal policy in second best economies with transboundary
environmental problems is relatively small by comparison with the correspond-
ing literature dealing with ﬁscal policy in second best economies with local
(i.e. within-jurisdiction) environmental damage1. Earlier research in the for-
mer category, nevertheless, addresses a variety of issues such as comparisons
between noncooperative and cooperative regimes with respect to tax policies
2, labor mobility3, ﬁscal competition due to international trade4 and strate-
gic aspects of public policy in the context of economic federations5.H o w e v e r ,
none of the studies that we are aware of combines transboundary environmental
problems and mixed taxation in the context of large open economies. An inter-
esting observation (discussed many times in other contexts) is that there might
be emission-leakage associated with the environmental policy decided upon by
national governments; for instance, if higher emission taxes in a particular ju-
risdiction signiﬁcantly reduces the demand for the externality-generating good,
then the producer price will also decrease which, in turn, tends to increase the
emissions abroad6. This suggests that, if the country is large in the sense that
its government can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the world-market producer price of
the externality-generating good, then it may have incentives to modify its use
1Earlier literature on ﬁscal policy under environmental externalities often abstracts from
international (or interregional) spillover eﬀects of environmental damage by focusing on ’one-
country’ model-economies. See the seminal contribution by Sandmo (1975) and the subsequent
work by e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) and Cremer and Gahvari (2001). See also the related
research on environmental policy reforms and so called ’double-dividends’, e.g. Bovenberg and
de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Parry et al. (1999) and Aronsson (1999).
2See Aronsson and Blomquist (2003).
3See Aronsson and Blomquist (2003).
4See Cremer and Gahvari (2004, 2005).
5See Silva and Caplan (1997), Caplan and Silva (1999) and Aronsson et al. (2006).
6Various mechanisms by which emission-leakage may appear have been discussed by e.g.
Gurzgen and Rauscher (2000), Conconi (2003) and Lai and Hu (2005). See also the empirical
study by Sengupta and Bhardwaj (2004), which is a case study applied to India.Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 3
of environmental policy. Our paper incorporates this mechanism into the theory
of income and commodity taxation.
As the number of countries is of no particular concern in what follows, the
present paper focuses on a two-country model, in which each country is charac-
terized by two-ability types. The countries interact both via the environmental
damage they impose on each other and international trade7. Our paper con-
tributes to the literature in primarily two ways. The ﬁrst is by characterizing
the income, commodity and production tax structure, as well as the provision
of national public goods, in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where each
country implements its own policy conditional on the policies chosen by the
other country. We show how the additional policy incentives associated with
the endogenous world-market producer price aﬀect the domestic use of income
taxation, commodity taxation and public good provision in a noncooperative
Nash equilibrium, relative to the policy rules that would apply with ﬁxed pro-
ducer prices. Furthermore, our results show that the ability to inﬂuence the
world-market producer price provides an incentive for each national govern-
ment to implement a production tax (in addition to the income and commodity
taxes) as well as to deviate from production eﬃciency in the public production.
The second is by analyzing the welfare eﬀects of policy coordination, where
the noncooperative Nash equilibrium constitutes the reference case. Although
the welfare eﬀects of policy coordination are typically ambiguous in the general
case, we show for a special case of the model that welfare improving policy
coordination may include, e.g., an increase in the production tax or commodity
tax accompanied by increased public production, or increased average income
taxation accompanied by increased public production. The intuition is that
each such reform contributes to reduced environmental damage (either directly
or indirectly via the world-market producer price).
The outline of the study is as follows. In section 2, we present the model, the
outcome of private optimization and market equilibrium conditions, whereas the
decision-problem of the government is discussed in section 3. Section 4 concerns
optimal taxation and public good provision at the national level, while policy
7We abstract from international factor mobility throughout the paper. Therefore, although
the policy incentives discussed below would also appear in a more general framework (with
factor mobility being yet another source of interaction between the countries), allowing for
factor mobility is clearly an important extension for future research.4 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
coordination is dealt with in section 5. We summarize and discuss the results
in section 6.
2 The Model
Consider an economy comprising two jurisdictions, which will be called ’coun-
tries’ in what follows. We begin by describing the consumers in each such
country. Having done that, we continue with the production side and market
equilibrium conditions.
2.1 The Consumers
In each country, i (where i =1 ,2), there are two types of consumers; a low-
ability type (denoted by l) and a high-ability type (denoted by h). The distinc-
tion between ability-types refers to productivity, meaning that the high-ability
type is more productive and faces a higher before-tax wage rate than the low-
ability type. Since the number of indivudals of each such ability-type is not
important for the analysis to be carried out below, it will be normalized to one
for notational convenience.
The preferences of ability-type j (j = l,h)i nc o u n t r yi are described by
the utility function Ui,j = U(Ci,j,Xi,j,Zi,j,G i,E),w h e r eCi,j denotes (the
consumption of) an environmentally clean good, Xi,j an environmentally dirty
good, Zi,j leisure, Gi a national public good and E the environmental damage.
We assume that Ci,j and Xi,j are normal goods. Leisure is deﬁned as Zi,j =
H − Li,j,w h e r eH is a time endowment and Li,j the hours of work. The
function U(·) is increasing in Ci,j, Xi,j, Zi,j and Gi,d e c r e a s i n gi nE and strictly
quasiconcave. We also assume that the environmental damage is caused by
the aggregate consumption (measured over all countries) of the dirty good (see
below), and that the consumers treat E as exogenous. The clean good is untaxed
and its price is normalized to one. The consumer price of the dirty good is given
by Qi = P +ti,w h e r eP is the producer price and ti the commodity tax decided
upon by the government in country i. Therefore, as both commodities are
subject to international trade, the producer prices are assumed to be equalized
across countries.
The consumer chooses Ci,j, Xi,j and Li,j to maximize utility subject to theMixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 5
budget constraint,
wi,jLi,j − Ti ¡
wi,jLi,j¢
− Ci,j − QiXi,j =0 ,( 1 )
where Ti(·) is the income tax decided upon by the government in country i.
Since the optimal tax and expenditure problem below will be deﬁn e di nt e r m s
of conditional indirect utility functions, it is convenient to follow Christiansen
(1984) by solving the consumer’s optimization problem in two stages. In the
ﬁrst stage, the utility maximization problem is solved conditional on the hours







Bi,j = Ci,j + QiXi,j
in which Bi,j is treated as a ﬁxed post-tax income. The solution to this problem











and the conditional indirect utility function





In the second stage, we can derive the hours of work by maximizing the condi-
tional indirect utility function with respect to Li,j subject to the budget con-
straint




The ﬁrst order condition for this problem is written
V
i,j
B wi,j(1 − T
i,j





B = ∂V i,j/∂Bi,j and V
i,j
Z = ∂V i,j/∂Zi,j represent the marginal util-
ity of private income and leisure, respectively, while Ii,j = wi,jLi,j is the labor6 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
income facing ability-type j in country i and T
i,j
I = ∂Ti ¡
Ii,j¢
/∂Ii,j the corre-
sponding marginal income tax rate.
2.2 Production
The production side in each country consists of one public and two private








G is the amount of labor of ability-type j (j = l,h) that the public sector
uses. We assume that both inputs are essential, that the marginal product of
each factor is positive and diminishing, and that the production technology is
characterized by constant returns to scale.
Turning to private production, the clean good is produced in sector c,
whereas the dirty good is produced in sector x. Production in each sector
is characterized by constant returns to scale. Given these characteristics, the
number of ﬁr m si ne a c hs e c t o ri sn o t ,i t s e l f ,i m portant and will be normalized to
one. The production functions can be written Fi
c(Li,h
c ,L i,l






x represent the amount of labor of ability-type j used by sector
c and x, respectively, in country i. Normalizing with respect to the low-skilled




































We assume that the government implements a revenue tax in sector x at
the rate τi, while the good produced in sector c is untaxed. We also assume
that the workers are perfectly mobile between sectors (yet immoble between
countries), which means that the type-speciﬁc wage rates in each country will
be the same in both sectors. The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization










































































we can deﬁne wi,j, Li,j
c and Li,j
x as functions of Li,h − L
i,h






















































for j = l,h. By substituting equations (13) and (14) into the production func-
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Since the two goods are subject to international trade, the equilibrium con-









Xi,j =0 . (17)
As long as equation (17) is fulﬁlled, Walras’ law implies that the market for
the clean good is in equilibrium as well. By using Qi = P + ti, equation (17)

























for i =1 ,2.
To derive equation (18), we have used Li,j = H −Zi,j and suppressed the time
endowment.
The environmental damage facing the residents in each country equals the







3 The Public Decision-Problem






The tax instruments are the production tax, income tax and commodity tax,
which are used for purposes of redistribution and public good provision. There-













8This formulation can be exempliﬁe db yt h ec l i m a t ep r o b l e m .
9Alternative approaches would be to assume (as in many comparable studies) that the
government is maximizing the utility of one ability-type subject to a minimum utility restric-
tion for the other, or to assume that the government uses a general social welfare function.
All qualitative results derived below would hold also under the alternative formulations.Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 9
where Ti,j = Ti(wi,jLi,j).
Since Ti (·) is a general labor income tax, which can be used to implement
any desired combination of consumption and hours of work for each ability-
t y p e ,i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt ou s eBi,h, Li,h, Bi,l and Li,l, instead of the parameters
of the income tax function, as direct decision-variables in the optimal tax and
expenditure problem. Therefore, let us rewrite the budget constraint of the
government by combining equation (21) with the individual budget constraints
and the zero proﬁt conditions following from the assumption of constant returns
to scale in production, i.e.
0=Si
c + PSi






The informational assumptions are conventional; the government observes
the income of each individual, although ability is private information. The
latter means that, in the absence of appropriate type-revealing mechanisms,
t h eg o v e r n m e n tw o u l dn o tb ea b l et oo b s e r v ew h e t h e ra n yg i v e nw o r k e ri sa
low-ability or high-ability type. We concentrate on the ’normal’ case, where the
government wants to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type.
Therefore, the relevant aspect of self-selection is to prevent the high-ability type
from pretending to be a low-ability type. The self-selection constraint that may
bind then becomes






Qi,Bi,l, ˆ Zi,h,G i,E
´
= ˆ V i,h (23)
where ˆ V i,h denotes the utility of a high-ability mimicker and ˆ Zi,h = H −φ
iLi,l
the amount of leisure consumed by the mimicker. The term φ
i = wi,l/wi,h < 1
denotes the wage ratio (or relative wage rate) in country i. By using equations










in which P is determined by equation (18). Note that the mimicker faces the
same before-tax and disposable income as the low-ability type; however, as the
mimicker is more productive than the low-ability type, he/she also consumes
more leisure than the low-ability type.
The Lagrangean can be written as10 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
Li = Wi + ρi[FG(Li
G) − Gi]+λ
i[V i,l − ˆ V i,h]+γi[Si
c + PSi












for i =1 ,2,w h e r eWi, V i,j, ˆ V i,h, Xi,j, Si
c and Si
x were deﬁned above, whereas
ρi, λ
i, γi and µi are Lagrange multipliers. Note also that P is endogenous to
the national government in country i and determined by equation (18). The





G , ti, τi and Gi. Note also that equation (19) appears as an explicit
constraint in the Lagrangean, meaning that E w i l lb et r e a t e da sa na d d i t i o n a l
(and artiﬁcial) decision-variable. The ﬁrst order conditions are presented in the
Appendix.
4 The Noncooperative Nash Equilibrium
It is convenient to start the analysis by evaluating how an increase in the world-
market producer price of the externality-generating good aﬀects the national

























for k 6= i,w h e r eβ
i =1+∂P/∂ti > 0,a n dNXi = Si
x −
P
j=h,l Xi,j is the net
export of the dirty good.
Equation (24) shows that the welfare eﬀect of an increase in P can be decom-
posed into three parts. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side appears because
the wage ratio depends on the producer price of the dirty good. If ∂φ
i/∂P > 0,
a higher producer price leads to an increase in the wage ratio, which makes
mimicking less attractive and contributes to relax the self-selection constraint.
In this case, therefore, the ﬁrst term within the square bracket contributes to
higher welfare. By analogy, if ∂φ
i/∂P < 0,t h eﬁrst term within the square
bracket contributes to lower welfare. The second term, γiNXi/β
i,r e p r e s e n t sa
terms of trade eﬀect. If the country is a net exporter of the dirty good, a higher
producer price increases the value of the net exports which, in turn, leads toMixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 11
higher welfare for country i. The opposite argument applies if the country is a
net importer of the dirty good.
The ﬁnal term on the right hand side of equation (24) arises because an
increase in the producer price of the dirty good leads to a lower demand for the
dirty good in the other country (conditional on the commodity tax implemented
by the other country). This eﬀect reduces the environmental damage which, in
turn, leads to increased welfare for country i if µi/γi > 0, and decreased welfare
for country i if µi/γi < 0. We can interpret µi/γi as the real shadow price
that the government in country i attaches to a reduction in the environmental
damage. The determination of this shadow price is the issue to which we will
turn next.
Following earlier research on environmental policy and mixed taxation10,
it is convenient to deﬁne the shadow price of environmental damage over the
shadow price of the government’s budget contraint, µi/γi, as this real shadow
price will play an important role in the optimal tax and expenditure policy to
be analyzed below. One may interpret µi/γi as the marginal value that the
government in country i attaches to reduced environmental damage measured





∂V i,j/∂Bi,j , \ MWP
i,h
E,B = −
∂ ˆ V i,h/∂E
∂ ˆ V i,h/∂Bi,l
as the marginal willingness to pay for a small reduction in the environmen-
tal damage by ability-type i and the mimicker, respectively. To simplify the
exposition, we will also use the following short notations11;
10See e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997), Aronsson and Blomquist (2003) and Aronsson et
al. (2006).
11Note that µi/γi is calculated by using the ﬁrst order conditions for E, Bi,l and Bi,h,
which explains why compensated derivatives of the demand for the dirty good in country i
appear in the expression for µi/γi along with uncompensated derivatives of the demand for
the dirty good in the other country, k. The intuition is that the government in country i only













































which refer to, respectively, (i) the increased net supply of the dirty good caused
by an increase in the producer price, i.e. the partial derivative of equation
(17) with respect to P, (ii) the change in the compensated demand for the
dirty good caused by increased environmental damage, (iii) the environmental
feedback eﬀect that would apply under a ﬁxed producer price, and (iv) the full
environmental feedback eﬀect. The component (1−σi)/ασi of the expression for
1/ˇ σi measures the change in the producer price12 of the dirty good that would
arise from a marginal decrease in E which, if multiplied by
P
j(∂Xk,j/∂Qk),
gives the corresponding change in the demand for the dirty good in the other
country (country k). Consider Proposition 1;
Proposition 1. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the shadow price of
environmental damage over the shadow price of the government’s budget con-
straint in country i can be written as
µi










































12As the national government recognizes the domestic budget consequences of its envi-
ronmental policy, this eﬀect is calculated with the domestic utility held constant. See also
footnote 11.Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 13
Proof: See the Appendix.
The environmental feedback eﬀect, ˇ σi, captures that a change in the externality
- due to a change in the demand for the dirty good - ’feeds back’ into the demand
equations (both directly and indirectly via the world-market producer price).
To guarantee stability of the model, we follow earlier literature13 by assuming
that the environmental feedback eﬀect is positive.
In the ﬁrst row, all terms within the square bracket are well understood from
earlier research (e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala 1997), and our discussion of each of
these components will, therefore, be brief. The consumers’ marginal willingness
to pay for reduced environmental damage is captured by the ﬁrst term, which
(by the assumptions made earlier) contributes to increase the marginal value
that the government attaches to reduced environmental damage. The second
term appears because a change in E will aﬀect the self-selection constraint.
If the low-ability type is willing to pay more (less) at the margin than the
mimicker for reduced environmental damage, the govenment attaches a higher
(lower) marginal value to reduced environmental damage than it would other-
wise have done, as a reduction in E in this case contributes to relax (tighten)
the self-selection constraint. As for the ﬁnal term, note that a change in the
environmental damage inﬂuences the revenues from the commodity tax: if a
reduction in E leads to increased tax revenues via the demand for the dirty
good, ceteris paribus, then the tax revenue eﬀect reinforces the environmental
motive behind the public policy and contributes, therefore, to increase µi/γi.
The opposite argument applies if an increase in E leads to higher tax revenues.
The second row of the formula for µi/γi appears because the world-market
producer price of the dirty good is endogenous to the government in coun-
try i. Suppose, to begin with, that 1 − σi < 0, in which case an increase in
the environmental damage (with the utility facing the domestic residents held
constant at the optimum) leads to a higher world-market producer price of
the dirty good14, ceteris paribus. In this case, and if ∂φ
i/∂P > 0 (< 0), which
means that a higher (lower) producer price contributes to relax the self-selection
13See Sandmo (1980). See also, e.g., Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) and Aronsson and
Blomquist (2003).
14Although 1 − σi cannot be signed unambiguously in the general case, we show in the
Appendix that it is negative if the environmental damage is weakly separable from the other
goods in the utility function.14 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
constraint, the government will attach a lower (higher) value to reduced envi-
ronmental damage than it would otherwise have done. Note also that country
i may either be a net exporter or net importer of the dirty good: if country
i is a net exporter, so NXi > 0, the second term on the right hand side con-
tributes to reduce µi/γi, while it contributes to increase µi/γi if country i is
a net importer of the dirty good. The intuition is, of course, that the higher
world-market producer price (caused by increased environmental damage) gen-
erates an extra beneﬁt if the country is a net exporter and an extra cost if the
country is a net importer. Interpretations analogous to those discussed above
-y e tw i t ht h eo p p o s i t eq u a l i t a t i v ee ﬀects of the terms in the second row - will
follow if 1 − σi > 0.
In the interpretations of the optimal tax formulas to be presented below,
we will add the (realistic) assumption that the government attaches a positive
marginal value to reduced environmental damage, i.e. µi/γi > 0.
4.1 Commodity Taxation
Let us now turn to the commodity tax structure. To simplify the analysis, we











for k 6= i, for a scale variable that inﬂuences the relationship between the
commodity tax on the dirty good and the shadow price that the government
attaches to reduced environmental damage. This scale variable will be further
discussed below. Consider Proposition 2;
Proposition 2. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the commodity tax on





j ∂ ˜ Xi,j/∂Qi
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Proof: See the Appendix.
The ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side are due to the self-selection constraint
and are analogous to results derived in earlier research (Edwards et al. 1994Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 15
and Naito 1999). As ∂ ˜ Xi,j/∂Qi < 0,t h eﬁrst term on the right hand side
is positive if leisure is complementary with the dirty good in the sense that
Xi,l − ˆ Xi,h < 0, and negative if leisure is substitutable for the dirty good in
the sense that Xi,l − ˆ Xi,h > 0. The intuition is that the government may relax
the self-selection constraint by implementing a higher (lower) commodity tax on
goods that are complementary with (substitutable for) leisure, ceteris paribus15.
The second term on the right hand side appears because a higher commodity
tax reduces the world-market producer price of the dirty good which, in turn,
aﬀacts the wage distribution. If ∂φ
i/∂P > 0 (< 0), an increase in this producer
price makes mimicking less (more) attractive, which provides an incentive for
the government to implement a lower (higher) commodity tax than it would
o t h e r w i s eh a v ed o n e .
The third term on the right hand side of the tax formula in Proposition
2 represents a terms of trade eﬀect; as such, its qualitative inﬂuence on the
tax depends on whether country i is a net exporter or a net importer of the
dirty good. If the country is a net exporter, meaning that NXi > 0,ah i g h e r
producer price of the dirty good increases the value of the net export which,
itself, is welfare improving and can be accomplished by lowering the commodity
tax (recall that ∂P/∂ti < 0). In this case, therefore, the third term on the right
hand side contributes to reduce the commodity tax. The eﬀect would be the
opposite, if country i is a net importer of the dirty good.
The desire to correct for the externality imposed on the domestic residents is
captured by the fourth term on the right hand side, which reﬂects the additivity
property discussed by Sandmo (1980). However, an important diﬀerence by
comparison with earlier literature is that this eﬀect is here scaled down with the
factor ϕi < 1. The intuition is that, by implementing a smaller ti than would be
required by full (domestic) externality-correction, it follows that the domestic
demand for the dirty good increases. Such a policy leads to a higher world-
market producer price of the dirty good which, in turn, reduces the demand for
the dirty good by the residents in the other country. The latter contributes to
reduce E and is, therefore, welfare improving from the point of view of country
i.
15Recall that the mimicker faces the same before-tax and disposable income as the low-
ability type. Therefore, in the special case where leisure is weakly separable in terms of the
utility function, we have Xi,l − ˆ Xi,h =0 .16 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
To further highlight the interpretation of the fourth term on the right hand
side of the tax formula in Proposition 2, i.e. in order to focus solely on
externality-correction, we consider the following special case;
Corollary 1. In a symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium (NXi =0 ),
and if the self-selection constraint does not bind (λ
i =0 ), the commodity tax





The corollary means that the commodity tax falls short of the marginal value
that each national government attaches to reduced environmental damage; in
other words, the externality-correcting tax falls short of the tax that would
follow from a standard Pigouvian tax formula for the domestic economy, i.e.
µi/γi. Therefore, and by comparison with a globally optimal resource allocation,
each national government does not only neglect that the environmental damage
generated by the domestic residents aﬀects the well-being of the residents in the
other country; it also reduces the tax below the marginal value it attaches to the
domestic externality in order to increase the world-market producer price of the
externality-generating good, which reinforces the ineﬃcient use of environmental
policy in the Nash equilibrium.
4.2 The Production Tax
In a standard model for mixed taxation with ﬁxed producer prices, in which
the environmental damage depends on the aggregate consumption of the dirty
good, production taxes would be redundant. In our framerwork, on the other
hand, the production tax is not redundant. We can derive the following result;
Proposition 3. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the production tax
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in which ∂P/∂τi > 0 and
P
j ∂Li,j
x /∂τi < 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 has a simple interpretation: if an increase in the world-market
producer price leads to higher (lower) domestic welfare, then the government in
country i will implement a positive (negative) production tax on the dirty good.
Note also that, although the endogeneity of the world-market producer price is
the only mechanism via which the production tax is operative, the production
tax will, nevertheless, serve multiple purposes. This is seen from equation (24),
where the national welfare eﬀect of an increase in the world-market producer
price is shown to depend on (i) a component relating to the wage distribution
(which is due solely to the self-selection constraint), (ii) a terms of trade eﬀect
and (iii) a component representing externality-correction.
To illustrate the corrective role of the production tax more thoroughly, con-
sider once again the special case of a symmetric equilibrium, in which we also
add the assumption that the self-selection constraint does not bind;
Corollary 2. In a symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium (NXi =0 ),
and if the self-selection constraint does not bind (λ
i =0 ), the production tax in











for k 6= i.
In this case, therefore, the only reason for implementing a (positive) production
tax is to increase the world-market producer price of the dirty good, which
provides environmental beneﬁts to country i as the consumption of the dirty
good in the other country decreases. The motivation for using the corrective
production tax highlighted by the corollary also relates to a more general result:
if the government has fewer eﬀective policy instruments than the number of
variables it wishes to control, then the commodity tax on the dirty good no
longer constitutes a perfect environmental policy instrument. The intuition is
that the domestic government cannot use the commodity tax to control both the
domestic and foreign consumption of the dirty good. Therefore, the government
also uses other policy instruments - in this case the production tax - for the
explicit purpose of externality-correction.18 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
4.3 Labor Income Taxation
The arguments behind the use of commodity and production taxation also carry
over, in a natural way, to the incentive structure underlying marginal income



















denote the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and private (disposable)












x/∂Li,l + ∂ ˜ Xi,l/∂Zi,l
α
for how the conditional compensated demand for the dirty good changes in
response to an increase in the use of leisure by ability-type j, and how the
world-market producer price responds to a utility-compensated increase in the
labor supply by ability-type j, respectively. Consider the following result;
Proposition 4. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the marginal income







































































.Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 19
Proof: See the Appendix.
The tax formulas in Proposition 4 distinguish between three basic motives for
inﬂuencing the hours of work; (i) to relax the self-selection constraint (via chan-
nels not directly linked to the world-market producer price), (ii) to compensate
the consumer for distortions created by the (less ﬂexible) commodity tax, and
(iii) to inﬂuence the world-market producer price of the dirty good.
We start by discussing the marginal income tax rate implemented for the
low-ability type. The ﬁrst motive for using income taxation mentioned above is
captured by the ﬁrst row on the right hand side, where both terms are analogous
to results derived in earlier research (Stiglitz 1982). As the mimicker needs to
forego less leisure than the low-ability type to accomplish a given increase in





Z,B > 0,w h i c h
means that the ﬁrst term on the right hand side contributes to increase the
marginal income tax rate. The second term on the right hand side in the tax
formula for the low-ability type, and the ﬁrst term on the right hand side in
the tax formula for the high-ability type, reﬂect that a change in the hours
of work aﬀects the wage distribution. If (as in Stiglitz 1982) ∂φ
i/∂Li,l < 0
and ∂φ
i/∂Li,h > 0, a decrease in the hours of work supplied by the low-ability
type and an increase in the hours of work supplied by the high-ability type will
contribute to reduce the wage inequality and, therefore, relax the self-selection
constraint. As a consequence, these eﬀects contribute to increase the marginal
income tax rate of the low-ability type and decrease the marginal income tax
rate of the high-ability type.
The ﬁrst part of the second row in each tax formula in Proposition 4 serves
to compensate the consumer for distortions created by the commodity tax16.
To see the intuition behind this result, note that the government has no direct
motive besides externality-correction to distort the consumption of the dirty
good; in other words, the self-selection component, the terms of trade eﬀect
and the producer price eﬀect only appear in the commodity tax formula in
Proposition 2 because the government lacks direct tax instruments to relax the
self-selection constraint and/or fully control the world-market producer price.
16This motive for using marginal income taxation was also addressed by Aronsson et al.
(2006); let be in a simpliﬁed model without asymmetric information.20 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
Therefore, if ti 6= µi/γi at the optimum, the government may (in part) use
marginal income taxation to compensate the consumers for the distortionary
eﬀect caused by the commodity tax. For instance, if ti >µ i/γi,t h ec o m m o d i t y
tax is interpretable as being ’too high’ from the perspective of pure externality-
correction, in which case it is welfare improving to stimulate the consumption
of the dirty good. This constitutes, in turn, an incentive for the government
to implement a higher marginal income tax rate if leisure is complementary
with the dirty good (∂ ˜ Xi,j/∂Zi,j > 0), and a lower marginal income tax rate
if leisure is substitutable for the dirty good (∂ ˜ Xi,j/∂Zi,j < 0), than it would
o t h e r w i s eh a v ed o n e .T h ea r g u m e n tw i l lb et h eo p p o s i t ei fti <µ i/γi.
The second part of the second row in each tax formula in the proposition
depends on the joint eﬀect of two mechanisms; how the world-market producer
price of the dirty good changes in response to an increase in the hours of work
(captured by Ψi,j), and how an increase in the world-market producer price
aﬀects the domestic welfare (captured by ∂Li/∂P). If, as one would normally
expect, the world-market producer price decreases in response to an increase in
the hours of work supplied domestically in the sense that Ψi,j < 0,a n di fa n
increase in the world-market producer price leads to higher domestic welfare,
there is an incentive for the government to implement a higher marginal income
tax rate for ability-type j than it would otherwise have done. The intuition be-
hind other possible sign-combinations for Ψi,j and ∂Li/∂P is analogous. Once
again, note that the sign of ∂Li/∂P reﬂe c t sad e s i r et or e d u c et h ew a g ei n -
equality (which relaxes the self-selection constraint) and a desire to correct for
the environmental externality; therefore, the incentive created by the producer
price eﬀect is a mixture of several underlying motives for tax policy.
To take the interpretation of the second row of each tax formula in Propo-
sition 4 a bit further, we may use the expression for ti in Proposition 2 and
substitute into the expressions for the marginal income tax rates. The second
row of the expression for the marginal income tax rate may then be rewritten



































In equation (25), the ﬁrst term on the right hand side shows how a self-selection
component familiar from the commodity tax formula (see Proposition 2) reap-
pears in the expression for the marginal income tax rate. If Xi,l − ˆ Xi,h < 0,i n
which case this self-selection component contributes to increase the commodity
tax (and, therefore, reduce the consumption of the dirty good, ceteris paribus),
there will be an incentive for the government to increase the consumption of the
dirty good via the income tax. With ∂ ˜ Xi,j/∂Zi,j > 0 (< 0), this mechanism
means that the government implements a higher (lower) marginal income tax
rate than it would otherwise have done. Incentive eﬀects opposite to those just
described will apply if Xi,l − ˆ Xi,h > 0. The second term on the right hand
side is also straight forward; if ∂Li/∂P > 0, the government has an incentive
to increase P, meaning that it will try to decrease the supply of the dirty good.
This may, in turn, be accomplished by discouraging the labor supply via a higher
marginal income tax rate. Again, the intuition is analogous if ∂Li/∂P < 0.
Finally, note that Proposition 4 does not presuppose that the production tax
is suboptimal from the perspective of the domestic government. In other words,
as the national government is not able to perfectly control the world-market
producer price of the externality-generating good by any single tax instrument,
all tax instruments will be used, in part, for the purpose of exercising (let be
imperfect) control of the world-market producer price.
As we did before, let us also here brieﬂy address the corrective role of tax-
ation by considering the special case of a symmetric equilibrium, in which we
also add the assumption that the self-selection constraint does not bind. We
can then derive the following corollary to Proposition 4;
Corollary 3. In a symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium (NXi =0 ),
and if the self-selection constraint does not bind (λ
i =0 ), the marginal income








γiεi,j > 0 for
µi
γi > 022 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...











∂Qk > 0 for k 6= i.
Therefore, in the special case, the government implements (positive) marginal
income tax rates in order to increase the world-market producer price. With tk
held constant, this will reduce the foreign consumption of the dirty good, which
leads to higher domestic welfare.




















to be the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private









to be the marginal rate of transformation17 between the numeraire private good
and the public good. The provision of the public good is characterized by the
following optimality condition from the perspective of country i;
17Ac o s tb e n e ﬁtr u l ee q u i v a l e n tt ot h a ti nP r o p o s i t i o n5c a nb ed e r i v e d ,i ft h eﬁrst order
condition for L
i,h
G (instead of the ﬁrst order condition for L
i,l
G ) is used to calculate the marginal
rate of transformation between the numeraire private good and the public good. This is seen
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Proposition 5. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the provision of the



































Proof: See the Appendix.
Let us start by interpreting the ﬁrst row of the formula in Proposition 5. The
left hand side represents the sum of marginal rates of substitution between the
public good and private consumption (i.e. the consumers’ marginal willingness
to pay for the public good), whereas the right hand side contains the marginal
rate of transformation between the public good and the numeraire as well as a
direct eﬀect created by the self-selection constraint. Therefore, if the terms in
the second row were absent, and if leisure is substitutable for (complementary
with) the public good in the sense that MRS
i,l
G,B − \ MRS
i,h
G,B > 0 (< 0), we
may relax the self-selection constraint by overproviding (underproviding) the
public good relative to the Samuelson rule. This result is well understood from
Boadway and Keen (1993).
The second row of the formula in Proposition 5 is, in a sense, analogous to
the corresponding eﬀects in the expressions for the marginal income tax rates
(given by the second row of each formula in Proposition 4). To see this more
clearly, suppose ﬁrst that ti >µ i/γi, in which case the commodity tax on the
dirty good is ’too high’ from the perspective of pure externality-correction. This
mechanism constitutes, in turn, an incentive for the government to stimulate the
consumption of the dirty private good by adjusting its provision of the public
good. Accordingly, if the public good is complementary with (substitutable
for) the dirty private good in the sense that ∂ ˜ Xi,j/∂Gi > 0 (∂ ˜ Xi,j/∂Gi <
0), the government will provide more (less) of the public good than it would
otherwise have done. The interpretation is analogous - yet with the opposite
policy incentives - if ti <µ i/γi. Once again, the intuition is that the government
uses its other policy instruments, in this case the public good, at least in part24 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
to compensate the consumers for the distortionary eﬀect created by the com-
modity tax18.
Turning ﬁnally to the second part of the second row, which measures the
policy incentives associated with the world-market producer price of the dirty
good, there are two channels via which the provision of the public good can
inﬂuence P.T h e ﬁrst is via the demand for the dirty good. To illustrate,
suppose ﬁrst that an increase in the world-market producer price increases the
domestic welfare (due, for instance, to decreased consumption of the dirty good
abroad and/or that country i is a net exporter of the dirty good). In this case,
and if the public good is complementary with (substitutable for) the dirty good
in the sense that ∂ ˜ Xi,j/∂Gi > 0 (< 0), an increase (a decrease) in Gi leads
to a higher world-market produce price and, therefore, higher domestic welfare.
The second channel by which the government may inﬂuence the world-market
producer price of the dirty good is via the supply side. If the government
increases the supply of the public good, then the resources available to the
private sector will decrease which, in turn, reduces the supply of the dirty private
good. Again, the policy incentives will be the opposite to those just described if
an increase in the world-market producer price leads to lower domestic welfare.
The assumption that the world-market producer price is endogenous for
each national government is also important from the point of view of public
production. We can derive the following production-ineﬃciency result19;
Corollary 4. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the production of the
















The intuition behind this result is, of course, that a reallocation of low-ability
18Another possible interpretation of the ﬁrst term in the second row is that it captures a tax
revenue eﬀect of the public good; see e.g. Edwards et al. (1994) for such an interpretation of
a corresponding term in a model without environmental externalities (i.e. where µi/γi =0 ).
This interpretation is, perhaps, less obvious in our framework, since ti − µi/γi times the
change in the compensated conditional demand only measures part of the associated eﬀect on
the tax revenues.
19This is analogous to Naito (1999).Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 25
labor from private to public production does not, in general, aﬀect the world-
market producer price in the same way as a corresponding reallocation of high-
ability labor from private to public production. Therefore, this production-
ineﬃciency result is solely due to the ability of the national government to
inﬂuence the world-market producer price: if this price were ﬁxed (as in the
context of small open economies), the public production would be characterized
by production-eﬃciency.
Let us ﬁnally consider the special case with a symmetric equilibrium with a
non-binding self-selection constraint, which we also did in connection to the op-
timal tax structure. The following result is a direct consequence of Proposition
5;
Corollary 5. In a symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium (NXi =0 ),
and if the self-selection constraint does not bind (λ
i =0 ), the optimal provision


































In the special case exempliﬁed by the corollary, the government in country i
attempts to push up the world-market producer price of the dirty good in order
to reduce the environmental damage created abroad. It does so by overproviding
the public good relative to the Samuelson rule, which reduces the amount of
resources available to the private sector and, therefore, the supply of the dirty
private good.
5 Policy Coordination
As the noncooperative Nash equilibrium analyzed in section 4 is ineﬃcient from
the perspective of both countries, policy coordination becomes interesting to
consider. Here, we do not interpret the concept of ’coordination’ such that the26 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
countries pool their resources in order to implement a cooperative equilibrium
(even if this is a common approach in earlier literature). It is more realistic
to assume that they agree upon smaller projects, the purposes of which are to
improve the resource allocation by comparison with the noncooperative Nash
equilibrium analyzed above. We will not discuss the conditions under which such
international agreements are likely to be formed; only the welfare consequences
if they arise.
Note that all public decision-variables have already been optimally chosen
on a national basis in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Therefore, a coor-
dinated inﬁnitessimal change in one or several policy instruments only aﬀects
welfare because changes in the public decision-variables in country i give rise to
welfare eﬀects in country k and vice versa. Let us begin by characterizing the
cost beneﬁt rule. By observing that the national welfare function facing any
country, i, equals the national Lagrangean in the noncooperative Nash equilib-





















B dBk,j + θ
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Equation (26) implies that a policy reform may inﬂuence welfare via two chan-
nels; a direct eﬀect on the foreign demand for the dirty good and an indirect
eﬀect via the world-market producer price. To simplify the analysis slightly,Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 27
let us add the (relatively common) assumption that the public good and the
environmental damage are both weakly separable from the other goods in terms
of the utility function. The simpliﬁcation gained by this assumption is that nei-
ther the national public goods nor the environmental damage will directly aﬀect
the world-market producer price. Then, by assuming that the noncooperative
Nash equilibrium described in the previous section constitutes the prereform
equilibrium, and if each national government attaches a positive marginal value
to reduced environmental damage (as we assumed above), we can immediately
derive the following result from equation (26);
Proposition 6. If Un,j is weakly separable in Gn and E and if ∂Ln/∂P > 0
(< 0)f o rn =1 ,2, a coordinated increase (decrease) in the production tax
accompanied by a budget-balancing increase (decrease) in the resources spent
on public production - with the hours of work and disposable income of each
ability-type and the commodity tax held constant - leads to increased welfare.
Furthermore, if ∂Ln/∂P > 0 and ∂φ
n/∂P ≤ 0 for n =1 ,2,a n di ft h en e t
export is small enough not to be a dominant source of welfare change following
increased commodity taxation, then a coordinated increase in the commodity
tax accompanied by a budget-balancing increase in the resources spent on public
production - with the hours of work and disposable income of each ability-type
and the production tax held constant - leads to increased welfare.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuition behind the ﬁrst part of Proposition 6 is straight forward. A higher
production tax in, say, country k contributes to increase the world-market pro-
ducer price, ceteris paribus, which is desirable (undesirable) from the perspective
of country i if ∂Li/∂P > 0 (<). In addition, if country k uses the additional tax
revenues to increase the public production - while the income tax is adjusted
in such a way that the hours of work and private disposable income are held
constant - the world-market producer price will increase even further, since the
supply of the dirty good becomes smaller when resources are reallocated from
the private to the public sector. In the second part of the proposition, the
condition imposed on the net export is to avoid that that the sign of the na-
tional welfare change caused by an increase in the other country’s commodity
tax becomes dependent on whether the net export is positive or negative. The28 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
intuition behind the second part is that an increase in the commodity tax in
country k decreases the demand for the dirty good in country k;t h i si sw e l f a r e
improving for country i as long as the associated decrease in the world-market
producer price does not give rise to more wage inequality. Increased public
production then plays the same role as in the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
To take the analysis a step further, and by analogy to Corollaries 1, 2, 3 and
5, let us consider policy coordination in the special case where the prereform
Nash equilibrium is symmetric and the self-selection constraint does not bind.
As before, this special case enables us to address the corrective role of the
tax and expenditure policies in a framework simple enough to derive several
unambiguous results. By focusing on pairwise changes, which is a minimum
requirement for budget balance for each national government, we can generalize
Proposition 6 as follows;
Proposition 7. If the prereform resource allocation is a symmetric noncooper-
ative Nash equilibrium, if the self-selection constraint does not bind, and given
the separability assumption in Proposition 6, it is welfare improving to;
(i) increase the production tax - while the hours of work and private disposable
income of each ability-type and the commodity tax are held constant - and then
use the additional tax revenues to increase the public production,
(ii) increase the commodity tax - while the hours of work and private disposable
income of each ability-type and the production tax are held constant - and then
use the additional tax revenues to increase the public production,
(iii) reduce the hours of work and private disposable income simultaneously for
each ability-type with the commodity and production taxes held constant, such
that the tax revenues remain ﬁxed, provided that leisure is not a strong enough
substitute for the dirty good to completely oﬀset the increase in the world-market
producer price caused by a decrease in the supply of the dirty good, or
(iv) reduce the private disposable income - while the hours of work as well as
the commodity and production taxes are held constant - and use the additional
tax revenues to increase the public production.
The intuition behind policy reforms (i) and (ii) is the same as in the context ofMixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 29
Proposition 6 above; the only diﬀerence here is that the domestic welfare eﬀect











for µi > 0, i =1 ,2 and k 6= i.
From the perspective of any country, i, policy reform (iii) is interpretable
to mean dLk,j < 0, dBk,j < 0 and dtk = dτk = dL
k,j
G =0(for k 6= i and
j = l,h). Increased marginal income taxation in country k (which reduces Lk,j)
is here accompanied by increased average income taxation (which reduces Bk,j).
A smaller number of work hours leads to reduced supply of the dirty private
good (recall that the resources used for public production are held constant),
which gives rise to an increase in the world-market producer price of the dirty
good. Furthermore, reduced private disposable income leads to lower demand
for the dirty good in country k which is, in turn, welfare improving from the
perspective of country i.
Finally, and again from the perspective of country i, we may interpret policy
reform (iv) to imply dBk,j < 0, dL
k,j
G > 0 and dtk = dτk = dLk,j =0(for k 6= i
and j = l,h). This can be accomplished by a combination of higher marginal
and average income taxation in such a way that the hours of work are held
constant. As we mentioned above, a reduction in the private disposable income
is, itself, welfare improving, as it leads to reduced demand for the dirty good
abroad. Spending the additional tax revenues on public production, then means
a reallocation of labor from the private to the public sector, which contributes
to increase the world-market producer price of the dirty good and, therefore,
decrease the foreign consumption of the dirty good.
6 Summary and Discussion
This paper concerns optimal taxation and public good provision in a two-
country economy, where each country is characterized by two-ability types and
asymmetric information between the government and the private sector. We
assume that one of the consumption goods, referred to as a ’dirty’ good, gives
rise to transboundary environmental damage. Each national government faces
a mixed tax problem, where the set of tax instruments consists of a nonlinear in-30 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
come tax as well as linear commodity and production taxes on the dirty good.
We also assume that each country is large in the sense that its government
may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the world-market producer price of the externality-
generating commodity via its tax and expenditure policies. The idea is to
capture the incentives facing large actors on the environmental policy scene; an
issue neglected in earlier comparable literature on mixed taxation.
We would like to emphasize the following results;
• In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the corrective component of the
commodity tax falls fall short of the marginal value that the national government
attaches to reduced environmental damage.
• If, in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, an increase in the world-market
producer price leads to higher (lower) domestic welfare - which, in turn, depends
on the properties of the wage distribution and whether or not the country is
a net exporter of the dirty good - the national government will implement a
positive (negative) production tax on the dirty good.
• If, in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, an increase in the world-market
producer price leads to higher (lower) domestic welfare - and by comparison
with the situation where the world-market producer price of the dirty good is
ﬁxed - the public policy also reﬂects a motive to reduce (increase) the hours of
work and/or increase (decrease) the hours of work spent in public production
relative to the hours of work spent in private production. As a consequence, the
endogenous world-market producer price also aﬀects the incentives underlying
marginal income taxation and public good provision.
• The public production is characterized by production-ineﬃciency.
• In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the national goverment also (in part)
uses the income tax and provision of the public good to compensate the con-
sumers for distortions created by the commodity tax.
• Welfare improving policy coordination - where the noncooperative Nash equi-
librium constitutes the prereform equilibrium - may include increased commod-
ity and/or production taxation with the additional tax revenues spent on public
production.Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 31
As a complement to the more general model, we have also analyzed the correc-
tive role of taxation and public provision in a special case, where the nonco-
operative Nash equilibrium is symmetric and the self-selection constraint does
not bind. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, we can then show; (i) that
the commodity tax (which is, in this case, a pure environmental tax) falls short
of the marginal value that each national government attaches to reduced en-
vironmental damage, (ii) that each national government implements a positive
production tax, and (iii) that the marginal income tax rates and level of the
public good are higher than they would have been had the government perceived
the world-market producer price of the dirty good as ﬁxed. In addition to the
policy coordination result mentioned above, we show in the special case that
(iv) a simultaneous coordinated increase in the marginal and average tax rates
(in both countries), and (v) a simultaneous coordinated increase in the aver-
age tax rate and the provision of the public good, can be designed to increase
welfare by comparison with the noncooperative Nash equilibrium.
Possible extensions of the analysis carried out here would be to consider a
model that contains both small and large open economies (which diﬀer with
respect to the perceived endogeneity of the world-market producer price) and
by incorporating the individual jurisdictions into an economic federation. We
leave these and other extensions for future research.32 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
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i nw h i c hw eh a v eu s e dt h a tSi
x =
P
j Xi,j +NXi,w h e r eNXi is the net export













































(A.13)34 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
for k 6= i (note that k is used here to denote the ’other country’). Therefore, by

























i/∂P)+γiNXi − µi P
j ∂Xk,j/∂Qk)
1+∂P/∂ti . (A.14)


















E,B for j = l,h into equation (A9). Next, use











































































for k 6= i.
Note that the expression within the square bracket in the second row of
















































































Finally, by observing that the expression for ∂Li/∂P in equation (24) directly
depends on µi/γi, we can derive the formula in Proposition 1.¥
Note also that if E is weakly separable in terms of the utility function, 1−σi
reduces to





E,B < 0. (A.18)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2














B [Xi,l − ˆ Xi,h]+γiti P
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∂ ˜ Xi,j



























> 0 for j = l,h. (A.21)
Therefore, the expression within the square bracket in the second row of equa-































j ∂ ˜ Xi,j/∂Qi < 0. Finally, by using the expression for ∂Li/∂P in
equation (24) and substituting into equation (A22), we obtain the formula in
Proposition 2.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
























where ∂P/∂τi = −(∂Si
x/∂τi)/α > 0. Rearrangement gives the tax formula in
the proposition.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Consider ﬁrst the marginal income tax rate of the low-ability type. By combin-










































∂Li,l.Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 37







































































































By substituting equations (A28) and (A29) into equation (A25), we obtain
the expression for the marginal income tax rate of the low-ability type in the
proposition. The procedure to derive the marginal income tax rate of the high-
ability type is analogous.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5













G,B. Then, use equations




B , respectively, substitute





























































































from equation (A7), gives the formula for public good provision in the proposition.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
The ﬁrst part of the proposition follows by observing that the welfare eﬀect is























> 0 ( < 0)i f
∂Li
∂P







∂τk > 0 ( < 0)i f
∂Li
∂P
> 0 ( < 0).Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 39
Therefore, a simultaneous increase (decrease) in the production tax accompa-
nied by a corresponding adjustment of the public production is welfare improv-
ing if ∂Li/∂P > 0 (< 0).






















































Since the term within the square bracket in the second row of equation (A34)
is between zero and one, ∂φ
i/∂P ≤ 0 by assumption and ∂P/∂tk < 0, it follows
that θ
i
t > 0 if the net export (which can take any sign) is suﬃciently small. The
proof is then analogous to the proof of the ﬁrst part of the proposition.¥40 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
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